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Abstract  
Over the past decade or so, aided by information and communication technologies, money laundering has 
seen a sharp increase. While traditionally money laundering was associated with drug cartels and 
warlords, increasingly the focus has shifted towards white-collar crime and terrorist financing. It is 
therefore important to understand why money laundering (and hence white-collar crime) comes into 
being and sustains over a period of time. This paper, while exploring the antecedents of technology 
enabled white-collar crime, undertakes a cultural analysis of the Silk Road case. The cultural analysis 
helps in understanding patterns of behavior associated with technology enabled white-collar crimes. 
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Introduction 
Over the past few decades, money-laundering activities have become sophisticated. And hence there has 
been a sharp increase in the amount of laundered money. While estimating the amount of money 
laundering is problematic because it is a concealed activity, some researchers have put forward efforts to 
quantify money laundering. Schneider (2010) estimates that money-laundering turnover on a global scale 
was $595 billion in 2001 and rose to $790 billion in 2006. Agarawal and Agarawal (2006) state that the 
amount of globally laundered money in 2005 was more than $2.0 to $2.5 trillion, which was about 5-6% 
of the world GDP; this increased dramatically between 2005 to 2009 by about 33% (Scheider, 2013). A 
2015 report notes that an estimated $2 trillion illicit capital finds its way into various financial institutions 
(Lam, 2015).  
In recent years crypto currencies have redefined the landscape for money laundering. This is because of 
lack of regulation and the democratized trust enabled through block chain technologies. Peer-to-peer 
currency systems are fast evolving and offer an alternative to the more traditional Fiat money, which is 
backed by nation states. Yet, because of the distributed nature of the currencies, there are concerns that 
money launderers use them systematically. Poland is perhaps among the earlier countries to adopt a peer-
to-peer payment systems – Billon where the exchange rate between Polish złoty and Billon has been fixed 
at 1:1 ratio. 
The paper is organized into four sections. The first section explores the nature of white-collar crime, 
particularly emphasizing the focus on individual and the role of institutions. We draw attention to the 
evolving normative structures that provide a backdrop for many of the criminal activities. Second we focus 
on the recent Silk Road case. While Silk Road is non-existent now, it provides an interesting context 
where businesses have been created, largely with the aid of advanced information technologies to trade 
stolen property and be compensated by crypto currencies. In the third section we undertake a normative 
analysis of the Silk Road case and draw out cultural manifestations of the changes. Finally we draw 
lessons of managing money laundering and technology enables crimes. 
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Understanding the Context of White-Collar Crimes 
Money laundering is a form of white-collar crime. However in the literature the definition of white-collar 
crimes has remained elusive. This is because new revelations and emergent challenges have surpassed 
traditional boundaries (e.g. see Box 1981). The concept has often been related to abuse of power, drug 
trafficking, fraud, exploitation, concealment, financial and psychological damage. And it has become 
difficult to demarcate mafia like organized crimes from political and economic corruption. This has 
resulted in spill over between the “good” and the “bad” guys.  
The Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) epitomized how white-collar crime and money 
laundering could be carried about publically without any significant intervention from the regulators. 
BCCI was founded in 1972. It was registered in Luxembourg and had head quarters in London and 
Karachi. It operated in 78 countries and had assets in excess of $20 billion. In 1991 regulators from seven 
countries finally raided and locked down the offices. Investigators found that BCCI was deliberately 
founded to avoid centralized regulatory review. BCCI was known to have laundered money for people like 
Saddam Hussein, Manuel Noriega, among others. 
The criminology literature has largely tried to understand white-collar crime by abstracting the individual 
from the context and labeling such people as “deviant’. Such individuals have been characterized as 
greedy who typically lack self-control (Morrison, 1995; Price and Norris, 2009). An exclusive focus on 
individuals unfortunately draws attention away from institutional and normative structures that provide 
an opportunity. The prospect may emerge from the fallacies of the modern economic system or the 
manner in which the monetary system has evolved, or the innovations abetted by modern technologies.     
Fiat money invokes a level of trust between the individual and the banking system. In many countries, 
currency bills note, for example the Hong Kong Dollar bills, “The Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking 
Corporation Limited promises to the pay the bearer on demand at its offices here Twenty Hong Kong 
Dollars”. Such a demand could be made because the currency was linked to either gold or silver. In the US 
the currency bills note something to the effect, “this note is legal tender for all debts, public and private”. 
Today however the gold standard does not exist and most exchanges are based on the trust we place in the 
current banking systems and nation states. The emergence of democratized trust orchestrated by Bitcoin 
and block chain technologies challenges the Fiat currencies. Yet the lack of regulation poses interesting 
challenges in terms of white-collar crime, money laundering and the role of centralized clearance houses. 
It can be argued that much of the increased incidents of cyber crime, white collar crime and money 
laundering are a result of changing nature of capitalism, where increasingly profits are generated from 
speculation, insider trading, circumventing exchange controls (Mitchell et al 1996).  Coupled with this is 
the general erosion of moral values – the Enron fiasco was a case in point where majority of the executives 
where business graduates from elite schools. 
Undertaking a Cultural Analysis 
In this study we use Hall’s (1959) taxonomy of behavioral patterns to interpret money laundering 
consequences and cultural manifestations. Hall classifies culture into streams that interact with each 
other to exhibit patterns of behavior – the silent messages. These streams form the primary message 
systems. Hall identifies ten different cultural streams, which interact with each other to produce 100 
different cultural settings. The framework helps in interpreting the cultural consequences of white-collar 
crime that are likely to cause trouble if not perceived in time.  A brief description of Hall’s ten cultural 
streams is presented below. 
• Interaction: Interaction lies at the hub of the “universe of culture” and everything grows from it. 
This interaction occurs both at the formal and informal levels. 
• Association: Hall uses the analogy of bodies of complex organisms as being societies of cells and 
association begins when two cells join. 
• Subsistence: Subsistence relates to the physical livelihood, eating, excretion and income, working 
for a living. 
• Bisexuality: This refers to differentiation of sexes, marriage, and family. 
• Territoriality refers to division of space, where things go, where to do things and ownership. 
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• Temporality refers to the division of time, when to do things, sequence duration and space are 
typical examples. 
• Learning refers to a basic activity of life. Educators could learn more by studying the context in 
which other people learn. 
• Play: In western economies play is often associated with competition. 
• Defense: A good defense system would increase the probability of being informed of any new 
development and intelligence by the computer based system of an organization 
• Exploitation: Companies that are able to use their tools, techniques, materials and skills better 
will be more successful in a competitive environment. 
 
An important question that arises relates to the value of undertaking a cultural analysis. Clearly a good 
understanding of the values and assumptions of various stakeholder groups helps in being responsive to 
the nuances. Halls’ culture map is a systematic interpretation of the theory to present a broad 
understanding of the various facets of culture. 
Silk Road - a case in point 
Silk Road was an online black market, which was operated by Ross William Ulbricht. The marketplace 
was used to sell illegal drugs and other stolen materials anonymously. Also, digital goods like hack tools, 
pirated software, etc. and forgeries of passports, social security numbers, fake licenses were all available 
for interested customers. Using the browser Tor, people involved in Silk Road were protected from getting 
caught. IP address is hidden by this service which makes it highly impossible to catch the culprits 
operating such website by making them anonymous. The buying and selling of goods was done with 
Bitcoin. Silk Road used the service, tumbler, again making it impractical to trace back a culprit through 
block chains. The transactions were obfuscated to avoid tracking. There were around 957,079 users 
registered with this website till 2013. There were 1,367 transactions taking place on a daily basis at $976 
and revenue was around 1.2 billion USD. 
Silk Road was created in 2011. In January of the same year, a user called altoid posted about the website 
Silk Road in some forums - bitcointalk.org and shroomery.org. He posted the same post on both forums 
asking for programming help. He even revealed the address for Silk Road website. In 2011 on June 18, an 
update was performed to the forum posting by the administrator where he declared that he wanted a false 
identity. Then in 2012 on February 5th, he wrote that Dead Pirate Robert (DPR) would be his new 
identity. FBI was able to find this information largely because on 23rd July 2013 they were able to take an 
image of the Silk Road server. 
However, the story took a new turn. FBI recorded a conversation which took place between DPR and 
FriendlyChemist, a vendor on Silk Road. On March 13, 2013, DPR is threatened by a vendor 
(FriendlyChemist) saying that he would leak the client’s information if he does not get paid $500,000. 
Then, on March 15, some information is sent by FriendlyChemist to DPR as proof that he would be 
releasing the information and DPR believes FriendlyChemist and asks him to make his suppliers contact 
him so that he can come up with something. So, on March 20, DPR gets a message from the username 
redandwhite stating that he was told to contact DPR. Then, DPR replies to him offering a deal that he can 
do business with him and offers him to be a vendor to sell illegal things on Silk Road. To this redandwhite 
responds that if DPR pays him FriendlyChemist’s debt, he will try to do business with Silk Road. On 
March 27th, DPR sends a message to redandwhite saying that FriendlyChemist is just an obstacle, and 
there won’t be any if FriendlyChemist was executed. On March 29, FriendlyChemist threatens DPR 
stating again that he would leak details of some vendors and 5000 users if he were not paid by him. As 
soon as DPR receives this message he writes to redandwhite asking how much he would want to find 
FriendlyChemist. To this, redandwhite replies that he would want anywhere between $150,000 and 
$300,000. DPR requests redandwhite to do the operation with $80k and asks him to do it as soon as 
possible. Finally, they both make a deal in Bitcoins worth 1,670 which is $1,50,000 approximately. After 
receiving the payment from DPR, redandwhite acknowledges DPR and assures him that his work will be 
done. Later on March 31st, redandwhite sends DPR a message that FriendlyChemist has been killed and 
states that FriendlyChemist won’t threaten him again. After getting this message, DPR replies that he 
needed a proof to believe what redandwhite was saying. Redandwhite sends DPR a photograph, which 
relieves DPR. However, there are no records with the authorities that redandwhite received any name 
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from DPR. Making this case even more mysterious, there has been no record of any homicide on the day 
when redandwhite give the proof to DPR that they killed FriendlyChemist in British Columbia. There was 
also no proof that FriendlyChemist was killed by redandwhite. 
Thereafter FBI was able to link Ross Ulbricht to posts on YouTube, Google+ and his log history. In many 
ways Ross Ulbricht gave himself up by accessing his social media accounts and his posts on public forums. 
While at times Ross used fictitious names, simple investigations revealed linkages to same parent account. 
Eventually Ross Ulbricht was arrested. Nearly $4 million were seized by the FBI. Estimates suggest the 
Ross profited nearly $200 million from his illegal activities.  
Normative Analysis of the Silk Road Case 
The Silk Road online black market web site allowed buyers and sellers to meet anonymously, trade 
securely and receive goods via local mail and courier systems (Backman, 2013; Baratt et al, 2014). The 
benefits of ease of use coupled with the security, provided a platform to build trust relations and thereby 
allow for growth beyond the local neighborhood community. It is in the matter of trust and reputation 
that requires the inclusion of Edward T. Hall’s (1959) use of ten Cultural Stream analysis as the 
methodology to understand the underlying structure of this online community and potential means to 
disrupt its use. As noted previously Silk Road was established by Ross Ulbricht and ran from 2011 until 
October 20, 2013 when FBI agents arrest and eventual successfully prosecuted him and shut down the 
original site from use. However, subsequent sites emerged with similar design and use indicating a 
usefulness and demand for such platforms. The Silk Road site had specific features which were: a focus on 
“soft drugs” (Dolliver, 2015) consumer level drug trading between suppliers, dealers and users; political 
agenda; use of encryption methods to provide secure access for both parties; and most importantly an 
Ebay style of vendor rating allowing for a feedback system of user experience (Johnson, 2014).  
 
Hall’s proposes ten cultural streams that interact with each other to provide a rich description of the 
cultural settings. Using Hall’s intercommunication amongst different streams, relationships of the Silk 
Road can be understood in the contexts socio-technical communities. The analysis of the Silk Road case is 
presented in Table 1 below.  
 
 
 
 
Stream Interrelations with other 
streams 
Information Security 
Implications 
Interaction: Buyers, sellers, and 
the administrators of Silk Road 
seemed to have minimal contact 
with each other, aside from 
questions about transactions or 
products. 
Interactions between buyers and 
sellers may have been influenced 
by the reviews provided by other 
buyers and sellers; the more 
reputable, the more likely 
someone would transact with 
another person. 
eBay is able to collect and 
associate names, addresses, and 
other personally identifiable 
information to buyer and seller 
profiles. None of this exists on 
Silk Road, making it virtually 
impossible for recourse, if a 
seller or buyer is conned. 
Association: From an 
organizational perspective, no 
hierarchy existed within Silk 
Road; only the written 
agreement that all transactions 
would be charged a facilitator’s 
fee. 
Ironically, the less the 
interaction a Silk Road user had 
with a buyer or seller, the more 
they had to trust that a 
transaction would go as planned. 
Large and legitimate online 
marketplaces have an array of 
policies and procedures that can 
deal with a number of issues. On 
Silk Road, if problems arise, the 
user has no option but to absorb 
the loss. 
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Subsistence: Silk Road had one 
administrator, imposed minimal 
rules, and was unregulated, 
creating a safe haven for illegal 
activity. 
A consistent and long-standing 
presence on Silk Road required 
that at a minimum, buyers and 
sellers delivered on their 
transactions, and earned ratings 
that helped recruit and retain 
new and existing customers. 
Silk Road encouraged 
selfishness and encouraged 
accomplishing “business 
objectives” by any means 
necessary, including, perhaps, 
taking advantage of the 
platform’s technical 
vulnerabilities. 
Bisexuality: Because Silk Road 
emphasized anonymity, profiles 
had no personally identifiable 
information including gender or 
sexual preference. 
Because identity was not an 
issue, buyers and sellers could 
focus on the transaction without 
accounting for any pre-existing 
expectations or biases. 
This system may be the one 
redeeming quality of Silk Road, 
in that it helped buyers and 
sellers focus more on products, 
and less on finding ideal buyers 
or sellers. 
Terrioritality: In the physical 
world, territories exist where 
sellers can freely sell their 
product, and where no other 
sellers can. Silk Road, a virtual 
environment, removed those 
boundaries. 
Nonexistent physical boundaries 
may motivate sellers to offer 
products that are superior and 
makes buyers keep coming back.  
 
Sellers can monopolize the sale 
of a specific product by offering 
something more superior than 
those of its competitors. 
Sellers may be able to see the 
potential this marketplace 
creates and could exploit its very 
lax environment with little to no 
governance, regulation, or 
technical controls. All this in an 
environment that’s hidden from 
the visible and commercial space 
of the internet. 
Temporality: Silk Road took 
advantage of the power of the 
Internet, such as the ability to 
bridge the gap between buyers 
and sellers of illegal products or 
services, transacting and paying 
or accepting payments 
anonymously, all while 
withholding personally 
identifiable information on their 
profile. 
Buyers and sellers were more 
likely to interact with those they 
didn’t know, since Silk Road 
removed both the barriers to 
entering the drug trade and risk 
in terms of physical harm.  
 
For users who are technically 
savvy, or have simply ever 
bought something online now 
can transfer those skills over to 
Silk Road. 
With some foundational 
programming skills, and a few 
Google searches, copycats to the 
Silk Road market may become 
commonplace, as old ones are 
seized by law enforcement. 
These types of marketplaces are 
too convenient and a lot of 
criminal opportunities to be had 
for one or more Silk Road 
copycats not to exist. 
Learning: Silk Road was not 
publicly accessible, so a 
technical learning curve may 
have existed for some users. 
However, once in the 
marketplace, any user who had 
created an eBay or Amazon 
account probably found Silk 
Road to be intuitive. 
Accounts in Silk Road were 
similarly set up to its legitimate 
counterparts such as eBay or 
Amazon, which led to increased 
transactions based on positive 
reviews of both buyers and 
sellers.  
 
Because anonymity was 
emphasized in Silk Road, there 
was little opportunity to get to 
Those who were first time users 
of Silk Road may have been 
taken advantage of in several 
ways. One method would be 
phishing, where a buyer may 
have legitimately asked around 
for information about Silk Road, 
but may have been sent a bogus 
email with malware or link to a 
bogus website. 
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know users on a personal level. 
Recreation and Humor: Some 
sellers and buyers may have 
tried out the Silk Road platform 
to see what type of business 
could be generated, so from a 
recreation perspective, it was 
just another market to sell in. In 
terms of humor, seller’s 
storefronts may have used this 
to attract, engage, and maintain 
its customer base. 
For some legitimate sellers, Silk 
Road may be the only place 
where they can find an audience 
and market for their product or 
service. 
Users who found that they could 
only buy or sell legitimate 
products on Silk Road may have 
been taking on too much of a 
risk, where they were conducting 
legitimate transactions next to 
illegal ones, unintentionally 
implicating themselves later. 
Defense: A Tor browser allowed 
all users of Silk Road to help 
keep their location anonymous 
and keep Silk Road on the 
darknet; Bitcoin users to pay and 
be paid anonymously; and Silk 
Road didn’t require personal 
information to be tied into user 
accounts.  
To keep all parts of Silk Road 
operating, the administrators 
should have split the business 
into different marketplaces, i.e., 
when they branched out the 
purchasing and selling of 
weapons to another website. 
Using multiple layers of tools to 
prevent the identities, locations, 
and administrators of Silk Road 
pose a security challenge in that 
there is no control in place to 
hold users accountable for their 
actions. For example, if one user 
steals from another, there is no 
option for remediation. 
Exploitation: When Silk Road 
existed, it had two distinct 
advantages over other online 
marketplaces: its ability to keep 
users anonymous, and for the 
marketplace to remain hidden 
from an otherwise publicly 
available Internet. 
Silk Road may have been a place 
where buyers and sellers alike 
were exploited numerous times, 
perhaps most often when 
dealing with first time users. 
Aside from a few rules about 
what can be sold or bought, Silk 
Road fostered marketplace 
where buyers and sellers 
transact at their own risk; 
holding no one, not even the 
marketplace’s administrator 
accountable. 
Table 1, A Cultural Analysis 
 
Discussion 
The Internet has provided a method by which large distances and time (Territorial, Temporarily) are 
eliminated with the low cost of entry for access and are used to connect and relate with dispersed 
individuals (Backman, 2013). In the context of Silk Road this made it possible for drug subculture 
members to meet and arrange exchanges of goods, independent of geographical constraints to local 
neighborhoods and regions. In turn the low cost of communication amplified the positive feedback loop of 
buyers and sellers thereby increasing word of mouth and increasing the use of the site. When talking of 
the Silk Road subculture in the context of territorial analysis the area in use was what is known as the 
“deep web” (Johnson, 2014) since it includes all of the addressing space and websites not listed on 
commercial search engines such as Google and Yahoo. These deep web sites are cryptically named and 
while accessible to data packets may need special routing and encryption for users to see the relevant 
data. This was the case with Silk Road in that membership required a willingness to overcome legal and 
technological barriers in order to participate and thus provided exclusiveness into the Silk Road 
subculture. The sense of group was amplified by its founder Ross Ulbricht using the justification of 
libertarian political values to justify the illicit activities. Using the Silk Road site as his political and 
philosophical platform allowed for control over the membership personal views as his alternate world 
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view took hold and was reflected in member postings expressing similar views and support (Backman, 
2013). This amplification falls under the cultural stream of “association” as well as incorporating “ 
recreation” in the form of relaying usage stories, personal and political views.  
 
The makeup of the Silk Road subculture was predominately white young males between 18 to 24 years of 
age and from the English speaking areas of the United States, England and Australia (Barratt, et al 2014). 
This category falls under the heading of “bisexuality” as it is focused on the gender issues for what is 
permitted between them. In this context the majority male group is supportive in methods of transport as 
well as use of drugs and while there appears to be black market trading in weapons the bulk of the 
transactions are narcotics found in club and disco settings. As such the cultural stream of “subsistence”, 
which embraces attitudes and ideas of what constitutes basic needs in life, is seen here in the aspect of 
drug use. The defining activity for the young male members of the Silk Road community exclude age 
related health problems and possible adverse reproductive issues of women and thereby allow for 
justification and mutual support for the consuming and trading activities. The processes used to provide 
for the subsistence beliefs are created within the Silk Road web site. This is shown by the interviews in 
which members detailed that community provided a wider range of drugs, better quality, more 
convenience and trusted sellers (Barratt, et al 2014).  
 
Looking at the four aspects of range, quality, convenience and trust an understanding of the technical 
aspects to provide them is necessary. The Silk Road community would not exist without anonymity 
anymore than local criminal activities can occur in public spaces. Therefore, the “territoriality” and 
“temporality” benefits alone do not allow for criminal activity and rather the use of the cultural stream of 
“exploitation”, “defense”, and “learning”. In the context of exploitation two technologies, besides the low 
cost of communication, are the ability to hide location and destination of the internet traffic used in the 
Silk Road community (Tor) and pay for goods via an untraceable currency (Bitcoin). The Onion Router 
project or Tor was a construction from the Department of the US Navy as a means of providing oppressed 
groups around the world access to secure communications independent of the host country's government 
(Backman, 2013). The Tor network works by providing host based encryption software and a list of 
access/exit route sites, which then encrypt each hop-by-hop route across the Internet independent of the 
underlying Internet routing. This then gives layers encryption (hence the idea of an onion) to each packet 
as it moves through the Tor network. The only known method to halt such use is to block the dynamically 
changing exit points from Tor on edge points to a service provider's network (Johnson, et al. 2014; 
Dolliver, 2015). In order to pay for goods a virtual currency is desired, as it is not tied to any one nation 
state and thereby, allows for the bypassing of money laundering controls with banks. The Silk Road 
community used the Bitcoin currency as it was established and allowed for exchange into local currencies 
(Johnson, et al. 2014; Dolliver, 2015). These two combined tools for anonymity were then supported and 
taught to the community members as the methods to bypass law authorities and fall under the 
understanding of “learning” within the context of the cultural stream methodology (Backman, 2013). 
These technical tools become the target of control and disruption by authorities as they seek to know the 
identities of the participants.  
 
The final element needed to provide a holistic understanding of the Silk Road subculture is that of trust as 
defined under the cultural streams of “interaction” and “association”. The security necessities of 
accessibility, confidentiality and integrity are provided for with the previously presented streams of 
“exploitation”, “defense”, “temporality” and “territoriality”. However, this does not explain the level of 
trust attained by Silk Road since anonymity does not in itself provide the buyer and seller with assurances 
that the transactions will compete fairly between both parties. In a physical market a seller will have 
personal contact with their community of buyers, participate in the local society and have a known 
location (Gregg and Scott, 2008). To provide a similar personal interaction to a diffuse population, eBay 
turned to the use of a rating system by which buyers and to a limited extend sellers could judge the quality 
of services, goods and buying experiences. All users benefit from the transparency seen, of not only their 
particular seller, but in general what is to be expected and asked for from buyers and sellers. This in turn 
allows for objective review of the process and removes the “anonymity” from the trust relation. This is 
unique as the participants are not known but their actions are and in providing this transparency trust is 
maintained. Such a system would be complicated and most likely inaccurate if placed into a physical form. 
The use of electronic technologies therefore allows for a new method of trust to form for non-trusting 
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participants. The success of such a rating system was seen in eBay research where there was an 80% 
probability of a repeat purchasing for those sellers with a high customer satisfaction rating (Gregg and 
Scott, 2008).  The innovation that Silk Road brought to the online drug market was just such a rating 
system (Backman, 2013; Baratt et al, 2014), which allowed for now secured and anonymous users, buyers, 
and sellers to trust one another during their illicit activities.  
 
Findings from the analysis using the cultural stream framework allow for the exposure of a potential 
method of disruption. Societies use technical tools and the sharing of such knowledge as a low societal 
changing impact, which modifies their culture over a period of time. As such the tools of Tor and Bitcoin 
allow for easy adoption by users wanting to participate with the online drug subculture and if such tools 
become unusable, other tools will be substituted. This leads to the insight that as the tools are 
compromised by authorities a pattern of cat and mouse will appear, with criminal parties moving to 
alternative methods or means to transact business. However, trust is necessary for any transaction to 
complete and it is in this culture stream of “interaction” that a method of disruption and reduction might 
be pursued. The Silk Road rating system provided the trust used in the community and as such any 
replacement site such as Sheep Market or Black Market Reloaded also needed some method of customer 
feedback. This feedback system did occur with the demise of Silk Road and manifested itself on these 
alternative sites with chat rooms dedicated to known good sellers of a particular product. Therefore as a 
method of compromise using the socio-technological approach of introducing a technology as a means to 
change the culture or in this instance reduce its use, the idea is to compromise the “trust” relationships of 
the subculture using the tools creating the trust. Leaving intact the technologies of anonymity the focus by 
authorities could focus on compromising the integrity of the seller rating system with disinformation 
leading to a “lack of trust”. Further, to disable the use of virtual currencies, in place of regulation, the use 
of injecting corrupting transactions, false profiteering scandals and publication of fabricated system 
breaches could be pursued as a means to discredit and attack the “trust” element found with users of the 
virtual currency. This disruption of trust could potentially lead illicit users to fall back onto traditional 
means of trust using traceable currencies, personal relationships and physical locations to transact 
business. Authorities would then be in a position to detect and prosecute using the current methods 
control.  
  
Conclusion 
It goes without saying that technology enabled white-collar crime is on the rise. In this paper we have 
undertaken a cultural and a normative analysis to understand the patterns of behavior associated with a 
criminal activity. It is important to understand these patterns since they provide a rich understanding of 
nuances related to how technology enabled crimes comes into existence and gets sustained over a period 
of time. Such an understanding is also useful in curtailing technology related criminal activities. 
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